THE VIRTUE OF LIBERTY DOES THE COERCIVE STATE HAVE MORAL STANDING
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Does The Coercive State Have Moral Standing?
All governments use force. Most, however are also coercive, although it isn't self-evident that they must be. Governments persistently and inexcusably violate the rights of their citizens, as well as those of many foreigners. Throughout recorded history no government has managed to remain untarnished by coercion. Some, however, have approached giving full official recognition and protection to individual rights. Others have not even given lip service to the idea.
By Tibor R. Machan
Why do governments appear to have the right to be coercive? Clearly many think that they do. What is there in morality that appears to give governments permission to do what private persons may not- e.g., to conscript us, to tax us, to regulate us?
The most widespread coercion by governments is taxation. There are other, more specific forms of coercion, such as military conscription, mandatory licensing of professions, and government regulation of business. Anyone aware of current socio-political life knows about these intrusions and probably has had personal experiences with them.
But aren't governments in the business of solving problems through the use of legitimate force? So why would their actions be questionable? Why would anyone suppose that conscription, taxation, and professional licensing are wrong?
Not every kind of force is coercive. Only aggression, namely, the violation of individual rights, can be so construed. I may use force to regain my possessions or to evict someone from my land and that would not involve coercion. Some force is retaliatory, some defensive, and some punitive. Coercive force, however, is inherently aggressive. It involves violation of basic or derivative rights.
Most governments do not simply make use of force but also engage in aggressive force, which is coercive. They make people give up their liberty for goals over which they have no say. They make people work for projects which the people would rather not support. They send people into war when these are not supported by the conscripts. And they tax, tax, and tax people for innumerable purposes that lack even democratic support.
Many think that government must involve itself in coercion. Some even regard it not just a necessary evil but a moral requirement. They view the coercive state as a good thing, For some folks this is entirely incongruous. That government would be morally justified doing what other people can go to jail for- theft, kidnapping, assault, extortion- seems entirely perverse. And it may well be. But when a practice has been going on for ages and millions of people accept it not just as unavoidable but perhaps praiseworthy, it behooves us to ask why they might think so. This is akin to asking why are there people who believe in palmistry or astrology when these are entirely bogus practices. Something must be at the bottom of these beliefs, lest we give up on human beings as hopelessly and incorrigibly gullible. Thus it will help to explore why it is so palatable for many people to regard governmental coercion morally acceptable and right.
America's Politics and the Coercive State
We should note from the start that most people in the United States find the coerciveness of the state somewhat lamentable. In short, they feel sorry about it, and wish it didn't have to be. But there are others who think differently and indeed see it as a virtue of governments to be coercive. They are quite forthright about their support of "statecraft as soulcraft"- to use that soothing phrase by which George Will entitled one of his books- and believe that soulcraft requires a good measure of coercion.
Others try to smuggle coercion into our culture by labeling it something else, such as "justice." Still others believe that government coercion is really the use of force in behalf of a certain kind of freedom- they call in positive freedom or respect for welfare rights, provisions to help us make something of our lives. Here it is difficult to spot the doctrine of coercion because it is obscured by conceptual muddles.
Most people know that the American political tradition rests on ideals which morally prohibit coercion. So in order to make room for it in our moral consciousness, it has to be re christened in an Orwellian "newspeak" fashion. Governmental coercion had been the nemesis of not just the Founding Fathers but especially the Founding Grandfather, John Locke, whose views back up American political ideology.
Locke's main reason for opposing coercion of one person by another had been that he regarded individual human beings as morally free, independent, and equal by nature. This means that as adults he regarded us all as responsible for making our own decisions or choices in life. So none of us is inherently subject to the authority of another. This also means that we were all regarded as politically equal. That, indeed, is the only egalitarianism inherent in the American political tradition.
From this basic frame of reference a conception of government arose which regards the state as an institution of laws administered by a group of "elected" (hired) persons who are essentially "employed" by those who hire them, the people. The authority to make use of force on the citizens comes, roughly, the way the authority of a referee at a tennis game or on a basketball court does- through the consent of the participants. The courts, the police, the legislature, the armed forces, and so forth are seen to be agents of the people.
The precise way in which the use of force can be authorized is a complicated matter. In any case, for Locke and many of the founders of this political society, government should use force only if the citizens consented to its use and only to the extent that the citizens themselves are justified in using it. That is what "due process of law" really means, namely, that government is justified in the use of force only if it adheres to specific standards.
Aggressive use of force, or coercion, is not sanctioned by the political philosophy which supported the American system of government, even if subsequent practice has diverged from it. (Indeed, the U.S. Constitution is itself a compromised document as far as the principles spelled out in the Declaration of Independence are concerned.) Before this revolutionary idea took hold on a large enough population so as to make a political difference, the coercive state had been looked upon with great favor by those who wielded the power of the pen. Locke himself forged his own views against paternalistic political ideals that flourished- indeed, were nearly taken for granted by most- in his day.
Sadly, however, not long after Locke's ideas flourished, once again the coercive state appeared to gain the support of morality. So the career of the free society, whereby government was to have been restricted to non- coercive use of force, was short lived, not only in practice (where it had never been complete), but also as a respectable idea.
What are the features of moral systems which so insistently seem to not just sanction or tolerate but eagerly to endorse government coercion? Why does the use of aggressive force appear to have the support of morality?
A Few Words About Morality
Why morality? We need to know a bit about this so as to understand why our question is really very important. If one were to regard morality as quite dispensable, then one would not need to be very disturbed if many moral systems give credence to coercion. One could simply reject morality through and through, as indeed have some who take an exclusively social scientific (e.g., economic) view of human life.
Persons, unlike other beings, must choose what they will do and they can choose badly or well. Morality is the most basic code of standards by which one can determined whether a choice is a good or a bad one. However much we might wish to dispense with morality, so long as human beings lack innate guidance to their conduct, it will be in vain to try. The economist's attempt to reduce everything to "workability," "usefulness," "practicality," or "efficiency" just won't work, since each of these invite the question, "For what purpose?" Thus something can only be judged workable if we know the purpose it is to serve. When it comes to assessing the merits of goals or purposes, it cannot be sufficient to talk of workability or efficiency. Something else is required, namely, "Is it a good, just, virtuous purpose we are talking about or is it something morally questionable?"
One could embark on lengthy discussions about the reasons for all this. For example, what is it about human nature, and reality in general, that gives choice such a basic role in our lives, how compatible is having to make choices with science and other disciplines? But that would take us too far afield.
What we now need to do is to see something of various moral systems so that we can tell why so many of them support coercion. In the end when we concern ourselves with public policy, the most serious issue is whether it meets standards of morality. Much else may be important, especially in a democracy. But in the end any public policy that is approved of morally will have a far greater likelihood of success with policy makers than one which goes against the moral grain.
Morality and Coercion
Most of us know a bit about how much controversy there exists about moral systems. Moral skepticism has indeed done very well because so little firm agreement can be found in this area. I will not try to refute moral skepticism here. I would like to suggest, however, that when we deal with a field in which one's very own quality as a person is at stake, and given the wide variety that exists in the quality of human beings, there should be no wonder about all the controversy. We are all inclined to paint ourselves pretty, morally speaking. It is understandable that sometimes we would even stoop to adjusting morality itself so as to make ourselves and our own chosen goals seem morally justified. As a last resort we may even deny that there is any moral truth, just so that we escape having wrath fall upon us.
In any case, what is crucial to note is that within moral systems certain components tend to give rise to coercion. In brief, it is a value component of moral systems that gives rise to coercion.
You might gasp at this, and understandably so. Doesn't every moral system have a value component? Then wouldn't every moral system support coercion?
Actually, only those moral systems support coercion which fail to place their value components in the proper human context. Let me explain.
Every moral system requires a theory of the good. Even before we can talk about what human beings ought to do- which is the main concern of any morality- the question has to be answered: "What is our goal?" And a theory of the good will provide our answer to this.
If our goal is the collective happiness of humankind, then when we wish to know what we ought to do, we need only to answer the technical or practical question: "Whatever will promote the collective happiness of humankind?" If it's God's will, then again we ought to obey it. If it is our self-interest, then again we need to know and follow it, and so forth. In short, a moral system presupposes a theory of the good which determines our proper goal in life.
Now, whenever a moral system lays extensive emphasis on its theory of good- forgetting something else, to which I'll turn in a moment- that is vital to it, it is likely to encourage coercion. In utilitarian morality, for example, extreme stress can be placed on the greatest happiness of the greatest number (with happiness usually understood as well- being or pleasure or wealth). The good is seen as the overall well-being of humanity or members of a society. In most religious moralities various forms of behavior are seen as the manifestation of goodness and the realization of such behavior is then regarded as the goal moral conduct must pursue.
Let me note here that although Soviet Marxism supposedly gained much of its support from science, in fact a basic theory about values was most crucial to it, as it is to every political outlook. In the Marxist-socialist conception of the state, the most powerful underlying justification relied
on a vital evaluative component, namely the supreme good of labor. Now, any morality can lay extreme stress on its ultimate goal, at the expense of another crucial feature morality must possess. And this can be transferred to public policy within any human community.
Morality and Coercive Public Policy
If, as far as personal ethics is concerned a moral system gives primary emphasis on goals, it is also likely to stress goals as far as public policy is concerned. Suppose that the members of a society morally prize helping the poor (or social harmony or economic stability or prosperity or spiritual and military superiority). In each case, public policy will very likely be geared toward the attainment of these ends, regardless of (or at least with little regard for) the means this is to be brought about.
A good example is ecological purity. It is prized highly by many, indeed regarded by them to be a supreme moral goal. So all forms of coercion are seen to be justified in that light. Because coercion seems such an efficient method for certain limited purposes- after all, force is the primary instrument of efficiency in classical mechanics and in much of modern technology- such an emphasis on achieving ends will promote its use.
To summarize my points thus far: first we need to appreciate the vital role morality has in human life and in the justification of public policy; second we need to note that the theory of the good which every moral system presupposes can be emphasized in a way that lays primary stress on the achievement of goals- or, to use a term employed by Robert Nozick, end-states. This, then, gives support to the instrument of coercion in the attainment of various public purposes.
What we now need to see is why this is all a very serious mistake and why it is indeed a distortion of morality. Once I have explained this, it will be clear that morality does not support the use of coercion but, on the contrary, requires its abolition.
Freedom of Choice and Morality
As distinct from the theory of the good within every moral system, morality must also be concerned with the specifically human mode of the good. What is this?
To answer, let us remember that there is goodness in connection with all life. Botanists, zoologists, and biologists are all involved in evaluations, judging things to be good or bad. This is because the best theory of the good links goodness to the phenomenon of life. It is the perishable nature of life that gives goodness a role in existence.
For things which cannot perish, the idea of good is inapplicable. But for living things there can be conditions and processes that are good, and ones that are bad. It depends on how they further or thwart life.
But regarding all life other than human life, to the best of our knowledge there can be no concern about moral goodness. The reason is that all such life lacks the unique volitional element, or the feature which we have come to know by the terms "freedom of the will."
Since the time of Aristotle it should have been understood very clearly that as far as morality is concerned, freedom of choice is essential. Human nature is such that the human good is inseparable from each individual's having to choose what constitutes his or her good conduct. If some goal or purpose is indeed right for us, it is morally right for us to pursue it strictly speaking only if we see the point of its value and choose it. Our own moral character, which is our highest good- our very excellence as persons- flourishes if and only if the good behavior we engage in, the good ends we promote, the good states of affairs we bring about, are all a matter of choice. (A very good further discussion of exactly this point may be found in Douglas J. Den Uyl, "Freedom and Virtue," in T. R. Machan, ed., The Libertarian Reader [Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982], pp. 211-225.)
Without this element of choice, our type of involvement with values is no different from that of other living things that behave from instinct or innate drives. Dogs, plants, birds, forests, and so forth are not moral agents. How they behave is a matter open for evaluation, but not for moral praise or blame. The reason is that such living things are incapable of choice. It is irrelevant to their goodness whether their behavior is chosen. And this is precisely what sets us apart from them, first and foremost.
Accordingly, those moralities which fail to pay sufficient heed to this are not just wrong but fundamentally askewed. When choice is taken away from a moral system's conception of human goodness, it ceases to be a moral system proper. It can still be a system of values, of course, but not of human values as such.
No Moral Coercion Possible
The basic moral support for the coercive state then is the failure to remember that morality is a system of principles serving a basic human purpose, namely, to enable human individuals to be good as human individuals. To even approach being a successful moral theory, this feature must be included within a moral system. For instance., if utilitarianism becomes overly concerned with the general welfare or if any religious ethics sees some rituals or forms of behavior as prior to the importance of stressing that these rituals and forms of behavior must be chosen for them to give merit to human individuals, then these systems are actually pseudo-moralities.
The coercive state is not then founded on any bona fide moral system but on systems which try but fail to be moral systems. Their failure to embody not just values but also free choice that must be involved in seeking these makes bad candidates for moral systems.
No public policy can live long if it loses its moral standing. The coercive state has lost it from the start.
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